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Abstract 
Conflict among member states regarding the distribution of net financial burdens has been 
allowed to contaminate the entire design of the EU budget with very negative consequences in 
terms of equity, efficiency and transparency. To get around this problem and pave the way for a 
substantive budget reform, we propose to decouple distributional negotiations from the rest of 
the budget process by linking member state net balances in a rigid manner to relative 
prosperity. This would be achieved through the introduction of a system of compensating 
horizontal transfers that would take to its logical conclusion the Commission's proposal for a 
generalized compensation mechanism. We discuss the impact of the proposed scheme on 
member states’ incentives and illustrate its financial implications using revenue and 
expenditure projections for 2013 that are based on the current Financial Perspectives and Own 
Resources Decision. 
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 1. Introduction 
In its 2005 Brussels meeting the European Council unanimously approved to undertake a 
comprehensive review of the EU budget that would cover all expenditure programmes as well 
as the Union's financing system. This agreement can be seen as a manifestation of a widespread 
dissatisfaction with the structure and outcomes of the European budget process that is shared 
both by the governments of member states and by independent commentators. 
There seems to be an emerging consensus that the EU budget, as it stands, does not adequately 
meet Europe's needs and challenges. While there is certainly disagreement about specifics, 
many policymakers and analysts do agree that way too much money is being spent on certain 
things and not nearly enough on others and have questioned the value added of different 
expenditure programmes.1 In addition, the EU budget has often been criticized for its lack of 
transparency for European citizens and even member governments and for the questionable 
distribution of net financial burdens that it achieves. General rules on the distribution of 
expenditures and financial contributions across member states are often violated by ad-hoc 
exceptions that introduce a considerable degree of complication and arbitrariness. Partly as a 
result of these exceptions and partly due to the nature of EU expenditure programmes, member 
states with similar income levels often end up with very different net financial positions. 
But if this is widely accepted, why has there not been a serious budget reform for the last 
twenty years? The answer to this question brings us to a serious structural problem that needs 
to be solved before we can hope to make any progress on more substantive issues. Its essence is 
that conflict among member states over the distribution of net financial burdens has been 
allowed to condition the design of the entire European budget. 
The first part of this note briefly discusses the nature of what we will call for short the net 
balances problem and explores its implications for the EU budget process. Building on de la 
Fuente and Doménech (2001), we then advance a proposal for a reform of the Union’s finances 
that should alleviate this problem and help bring about a more equitable and efficient 
budgetary policy. 
 
 2. The net balances problem and its implications 
The basic design of the European budget, on both its expenditure and revenue sides, is decided 
at an intergovernmental meeting, the European Council, where all actors have veto power. 
Experience has shown that member states' behaviour in budget negotiations has often been 
driven by concerns over their net financial returns, understood in a very narrow sense as the 
difference between their respective contributions to the financing of the Union and the return 
flow of expenditures in their territory that are financed by the European budget. As a result, 
Council meetings have been dominated by distributional issues and member states have not 
                                                
1 Among many others, see Begg (2005), Sapir et al (2003), Boldrin and Canova (2001) and DEFRA (2005). 
The first two references include general analyses of the deficiencies of the EU budget and the last two are 
very critical discussions of the two core EU policies: cohesion and agriculture. 
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hesitated to threaten to block budget agreements in order to protect their perceived national 
interests. Needless to say, this has made negotiations rather complicated. More importantly, the 
ongoing distributional conflict among member states has seriously distorted budget outcomes 
in ways that involve large losses in the efficiency, equity and transparency of EU finances. 
 
 A key obstacle to substantive budget reform, 
Perhaps the most important cost of the net balances problem is that it has been a very serious 
obstacle to substantive budget reform. A clear illustration can be found in the negotiations 
leading to the approval of the last two multi-annual EU budgetary frameworks (the so-called 
financial perspectives). In both cases there was widespread agreement on the need to devote 
additional resources to areas of common European interest in order to respond to the economic 
and political challenges posed by a changing international environment. In both cases what 
were in fact rather timid proposals by the Commission for increased funding in key areas had to 
be severely curtailed. The required money simply could not be found because net contributors 
blocked any increase in the overall budget ceiling for fear of having their deficits increased, and 
the main beneficiaries of existing expenditure programmes or financing privileges strongly 
resisted any attempt to curtail their funding. As a result, the final outcome looked very much 
like the status quo with only marginal changes in the structure of the budget. 
 
 with a heavy cost in terms of simplicity and transparency 
A second important cost is that the side payments necessary to secure the approval of a 
financial package have resulted in an increasingly complex and untransparent budget, riddled 
with preferential clauses and ad-hoc exemptions to general rules that would be very difficult to 
explain to the average European citizen. 
As the situation stands now, there is a rather big and questionable exception on the revenue 
side of the budget -- the rebate to the UK of two thirds of its ex-ante deficit--  which involves 
additional exceptions through the discounts granted to Austria, Germany, Sweden and the 
Netherlands in the financing of the rebate. In addition, these four countries enjoy reduced rates 
of payment for the part of their national contributions that is linked to the VAT base and two of 
them have been granted special reductions in their GNI-based contributions. On the 
expenditure side, the situation is not very different, particularly in connection with the 
allocation of cohesion funding. The current financial perspectives are full of special provisions 
in favour of specific countries or regions that violate the general allocation rules set out in the 
same document (see CEU 2005). These special provisions affect at least 16 of the member states 
of the EU. 
 
 which does not guarantee an equitable distibution of net financial burdens 
Such messiness might be acceptable if it served to achieve an equitable distribution of net 
financial burdens among member states. Looking at the numbers, however, it is hard to argue 
that this has been the case. 
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Figure 1 shows the relationship between member states’ relative prosperity and their net 
financial positions in 2006. As an indicator of relative prosperity we use income per capita in 
normalized PPS units2 (roughly speaking, in euros of average purchasing power) measured in 
percentage deviations from the EU average. Financial positions are measured by what we call 
per capita relative real balances. To construct this variable, we first compute each country's per 
capita net balance by subtracting its contribution to the EU from EU expenditures allocated to it, 
with both variables measured in normalized PPS units per capita. From this we subtract the 
average per capita net balance of the entire EU, which will generally be negative because certain 
types of expenditure (like foreign aid) cannot be allocated to any member country. Finally, the 
result of these calculations is normalized by average EU income per capita in normalized PPS 
units. 
 
Figure 1: Per capita relative real balances vs. relative real income per capita in 2006 
 
- Key: At = Austria; Be = Belgium; Cy = Cyprus; Cz = Czech Republic; De = Germany; Dk = Denmark; Ee = 
Estonia; El = Greece; Es = Spain; Fi =  Finland; Fr =  France; Hu = Hungary; Ie = Ireland; It = Italy; Lt = 
Lithuania; Lu = Luxembourg; Lv = Latvia; Mt = Malta; Nl = Netherlands; Pl = Poland; Pt = Portugal; Se = 
Sweden; Si = Slovenia; Sk = Slovakia; UK = United Kingdom. 
 
 
Applied to the case at hand, commonly accepted notions of equity would require that net 
financial burdens should be distributed in proportion to ability to pay. Hence, richer member 
states should pay more than poor ones, and countries with the same level of real income should 
have similar financial positions. The figure shows that the EU budget roughly meets the first of 
these criteria but certainly not the second.  
The negative slope of the regression line we have fitted to these data (weighting countries by 
population) indicates that the net effect of the EU budget is redistributive, as relative balances 
                                                
2 Throughout the paper, we have renormalized member state relative price indices so that the price level 
of the EU as a whole is equal to 1 in each year. We apply the same correction to income levels and budget 
flows expressed in PPS units to convert them to “normalized PPS units.”  
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are on average positive in poor countries and negative in rich ones. The slope of this line, which 
we will call the redistribution coefficient, is 0.0175. Given the definition of our variables, this 
parameter indicates that, for a representative European citizen, the net effect of the EU budget is 
equivalent to a flat tax of 1.75% levied on the difference between his income (adjusted for 
purchasing power differences) and the EU average -- or to a subsidy of the same magnitude if 
his income is below the average.  
On the other hand, countries of similar wealth often end up with very different financial 
positions. Greece, Ireland and Luxembourg are extraordinarily well treated given their income 
levels. France and Germany have approximately the same income per capita, but the latter's 
deficit is roughly twice the size of the former's. The same is true of the UK and Sweden or 
Austria and Denmark. On the opposite end of the income scale, the per capita surpluses of 
Greece and Malta are six times larger than those of Slovenia and the Czech Republic. 
 
 3. The way forward: changing incentives by isolating redistributional issues  
The European Commission and many analysts have argued repeatedly that net fiscal balances 
are a risky accounting exercise that, at best, captures in a rather imperfect way only a small part 
of the benefits of membership in the European Union.3 While this is certainly true, we argue 
that these balances cannot be ignored. However imperfectly, they do measure the most visible 
and easily quantifiable aspect of such benefits. As a result, the views of European citizens and 
member state governments on the overall fairness of the system are likely to depend critically 
on the extent to which the distribution of such balances is perceived to be reasonable. And 
however misguided this concern may be in some cases, it is unlikely that we can make it go 
away just by preaching about the need to take a broader view of national interests. 
A more realistic approach to the problem is to take member states’ concern with net balances as 
given and ask what can be done to minimize its undesirable side effects. A possible way out of 
the current deadlock would be to change the structure of the EU budgetary system in such a 
way that the unavoidable conflict over distributional issues can be isolated and does not spill 
over into the rest of the budget discussion. This requires the introduction of a new budgetary 
instrument that can be used to neutralize the undesired distributional consequences of core EU 
policies. The logical choice would seem to be a system of horizontal transfers across member 
states. In our opinion, such a system should be designed to link member country net balances 
rigidly to their levels of relative prosperity.  
We believe the adoption of such a system would help improve the equity and transparency of 
the EU budget while opening the way for significant efficiency gains by changing member 
government incentives in a manner that would make substantive reform possible. A simple rule 
linking net balances to per capita income levels would greatly simplify the European budget 
and increase its transparency by eliminating the need to distort expenditure policies in order to 
achieve an acceptable distribution of net financial contributions. It would also ensure that this 
                                                
3 See for instance CEC (1998 and 2004). 
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distribution will be in strict accordance with a simple equity principle that is easy to explain 
and can be supported by a large majority of European citizens. 
More importantly for our purposes here, the introduction of such a rule would also radically 
change member governments’ incentives in budget negotiations. Under the current situation 
EU expenditures are perceived as having an almost zero marginal cost to national treasuries. 
Hence, member state representatives enter Council meetings with an incentive to fight for every 
possible increase in spending favoring their country -- and this includes programs they would 
probably not be willing to finance with their own budgets. If net balances are set in advance, so 
that expenditure gains in any given program will have to be financed at the margin by national 
budgets, this perverse incentive disappears.  
This has two important implications. The first one is that funding for horizontal programmes 
can be allocated more efficiently because the Council or the Commission need not worry about 
their impact on member state net balances. The second is that national governments are likely to 
become more selective in their support for EU activities. Although we believe that this would be 
a positive development in general terms, there is some risk that it may lead to the curtailment of 
those programs that are valued more by the Commission than by member states. To the extent 
that the Commission defends truly European interests, rather than national ones, this would be 
an undesirable outcome. 
  
 4. A specific proposal and its financial implications 
In its 2004 report on the financing of the Union (CEC 2004), the European Commission has 
called for the introduction of a generalized compensation mechanism for member countries 
experiencing “excessive deficits.” The Commission’s central proposal essentially involves 
extending a streamlined version of the UK rebate to all net contributors in a similar situation. 
Member countries experiencing deficits over 0.35% of GNI would be granted a rebate of two 
thirds of the excess over this threshold. These rebates would be financed by all member states in 
proportion to their national income. The total amount of compensatory payments would be 
capped at 7.5 billion euros. If this maximum amount were to be exceeded, rebate rates would be 
reduced in the proportion needed to respect the cap. 
While the Commission’s proposal would be a step in the right direction, in our opinion it does 
not go far enough. It tackles only one side of the problem (excessive deficits but not excessive 
surpluses), it does so only partially and without taking into account the relative prosperity of 
net contributors and introduces an unnecessary discontinuity in the form of a fixed deficit 
threshold below which no corrective action would be taken. As a result of all this, its 
contribution to budget equity will be quite limited, as it will mitigate but not eliminate 
differences of treatment across member states only at one tail of the income distribution. Its 
effects on incentives will also be reduced by its limited applicability to a small subset of member 
countries, by the capping mechanism and by the threshold and partial rebate features. 
Our proposal involves taking the principle behind the Commission’s proposal to its logical 
conclusion. This principle, which was already established in the 1984 Fontainebleau Council, 
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requires that no member state should sustain a budgetary burden that is excessive in relation to 
its relative prosperity. The simplest and most straightforward way to achieve this is to make 
sure that budgetary burdens, measured in net terms, are proportional to relative prosperity. 
Hence, we would advocate the establishment of a budgetary rule that would make relative real 
balances per capita, as defined above, inversely proportional to member states’ relative income 
per capita in real terms (in PPS units) measured in deviations from the EU average. In terms of 
Figure 1, our proposal would amount to making sure that all countries are on the estimated 
regression line, or on some other agreed upon line going through the origin. 
This can be achieved through a system of horizontal transfers across member states that would 
fully compensate any deviations from the desired allocation rule that would result from the 
standard financing mechanisms of the Union and from its expenditure policies. These 
compensating transfers would be calculated and paid following the same procedures that are 
now used in the case of the UK rebate. A first estimate of the compensatory transfer 
corresponding to year t would be paid at t+1 and final settlement would come at t+4, with the 
possibility of intermediate corrections as the final data required for the calculation become 
available. 
Under this scheme, all member states with real incomes below the EU average would receive a 
net transfer from the richer members of the Union. Such transfers should, however, be subject to 
strict conditionality and additionality requirements to ensure that they are used to finance 
growth-enhancing investments that will help mitigate income disparities. To achieve this, 
allocations under cohesion policies should be at least equal to the desired final net balances for 
all countries with below average incomes. In addition, these countries should not be allowed to 
use compensatory transfers as a way to free up cohesion funds for consumption purposes. To 
prevent this, compensating transfers should be calculated on the basis of expected rather than 
actual cohesion policy disbursements. 
Adopting the procedure we have just outlined would effectively split budget negotiations into 
two separate parts. On the one hand, member countries will have to bargain over the desired 
level of financial solidarity, as measured by the redistribution parameter that links net balances 
to relative income (that is, by the slope of the regression line shown in Figure 1). On the other, 
expenditure programmes and the standard financing mechanism of the Union will have to be 
discussed. The main advantage of the setup is that member countries will be able to think about 
how much money the Union needs and how it should be spent without the distraction of 
worrying about how such decisions will affect their own finances. 
As shown in the Appendix, the final contribution of each member state to the EU budget (net of 
compensatory transfers) under the proposed scheme will be approximately equal to the sum of 
three components.4 The first two amount to full repayment of all EU expenditure allocated to 
the country and the equal per capita sharing in real terms of “overhead” or general-interest EU 
expenditures (including external action and administration). The last component will be a 
                                                
4 The equality is not exact because compensatory transfers, which are estimated in real terms, have to be 
adjusted so that they add up to zero when measured in current euros. See the Appendix. 
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redistributive payment whose per capita amount will be a function of the difference between 
the country’s real income per capita and the EU average. Hence, the marginal cost to a member 
state of allocated expenditure will be equal to one, unlike in the present system where it is 
considerably below one since all countries basically finance all EU expenditures in proportion to 
their share in nominal aggregate income. As a result, member countries will have no incentive 
to approve expenditures they would not be willing to finance with their own budgets and will 
have the correct incentives to channel through the European budget only those programmes 
where the EU can provide some added value.  
 
 Financial implications: a tentative estimate 
To illustrate the financial implications of our proposal, we will use the estimates of budget 
flows across EU member states in the final year of the current Financial Perspectives that we 
have constructed in a companion paper (de la Fuente, Rant and Doménech, DRD 2008) working 
with the country allocations established in those Perspectives (CEU, 2005), the Commission's 
growth forecasts contained in the Aging Report (ECP, 2006) and our own projections of the 
evolution of relative prices in EU member states. Needless to say, the exercise is extremely risky 
but it will give us an idea of the order of magnitude of the required transfers and of the 
expected direction in which they will flow. 
 
 
Figure 2: Per capita relative real balances vs. relative real income per capita in 2013 
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- Key: Bg = Bulgaria; Ro = Romania. See Figure 1 for the rest. 
- Source: de la Fuente, Rant and Doménech (2008). 
 
Figure 2 shows the relationship between member states’ expected relative per capita real 
balances and expected real income per capita in 2013 along with the fitted regression line that 
captures the average degree of redistribution through the EU budget. The value of the 
redistribution coefficient for this year (2.68%) is relatively low by historical standards (see 
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DRD 2008) but considerable higher than the extremely low values observed in the transition 
years following Eastern enlargement. 
 
Table 1: Estimated excess balances and compensating transfers, 2013 
keeping constant the observed level of redistribution (at 2.68%) 
                                               Excess balances                                                  Compensating transfers     . 
 
1. per capita 
as a % of EU 
avge. GNIpc 
2. per 
capita in 
PPS units 
3. total in 
million PPS 
4. relative 
price index 
5. total in 
meuros 
6. adjusted 
total in 
meuros 
Luxembourg 2.69% 723.9 355 1.06 -375 -392 
Ireland 1.43% 384.9 1,718 1.17 -2,007 -2,099 
Estonia 0.91% 245.3 317 0.72 -228 -238 
Hungary 0.89% 239.3 2,369 0.69 -1,643 -1,718 
Czech Rep. 0.88% 236.7 2,381 0.72 -1,721 -1,799 
Lithuania 0.83% 224.2 738 0.65 -479 -500 
Latvia 0.60% 161.5 355 0.66 -234 -245 
Slovenia 0.50% 133.5 269 0.82 -222 -232 
Slovakia 0.49% 133.2 710 0.68 -479 -501 
Greece 0.41% 109.2 1,239 0.89 -1,097 -1,147 
UK 0.19% 51.1 3,146 1.11 -3,482 -3,641 
Austria 0.19% 49.9 415 1.05 -438 -458 
Denmark 0.18% 48.5 266 1.21 -323 -338 
Poland 0.15% 41.6 1,563 0.67 -1,041 -1,089 
Netherlands 0.11% 29.7 501 1.07 -535 -560 
Portugal 0.11% 29.2 313 0.85 -267 -279 
Finland 0.09% 23.5 125 1.11 -139 -145 
Sweden 0.07% 17.5 163 1.13 -184 -193 
Bulgaria 0.01% 2.8 20 0.51 -10 -11 
Spain -0.06% -14.9 -670 0.96 640 611 
Belgium -0.12% -33.5 -356 1.06 376 359 
France -0.13% -34.0 -2,183 1.05 2,298 2,194 
Germany -0.23% -61.2 -5,072 1.05 5,308 5,066 
Malta -0.29% -79.3 -34 0.78 27 25 
Cyprus -0.38% -101.8 -83 0.91 75 72 
Italy -0.38% -102.8 -6,029 1.02 6,127 5,848 
Romania -0.45% -120.2 -2,538 0.58 1,478 1,411 
       
total extra contributions due:  16,964  14,905 15,584 
total positive transfers due:  16,964  16,327 15,584 
transfers - contributions    1,423  
adjustment factor    4.55%  
       
new entrants     -4,825 
cohesion 4      -2,914 
rest of EU15      7,739 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
- Note: Columns 5 and 6 in millions of 2004 euros. 
 
As a starting point, we will take as given the existing degree of redistribution through the 
European budget and calculate the amount of the compensating transfers that would be 
required to move all countries to the estimated redistribution line. Table 1 shows the results of 
this calculation. Column 1 shows member countries’ excess balances measured as a fraction of 
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average EU GNI per capita in normalized PPS units. Excess balances are defined as the 
difference between observed and desired relative balances. In graphical terms, they correspond 
to the vertical distance between the fitted regression line and the dot representing each 
country’s position in Figure 2. Column 2 converts these amounts to normalized PPS units per 
capita. Multiplying these figures by each country’s population, we obtain its total excess 
balance in PPS units, which is shown in column 3. Next, we multiply this amount by the index 
of relative country prices shown in column 4 and change its sign to obtain a preliminary 
estimate of the compensating transfer due to each country expressed in nominal terms (in euros 
of 2004). Hence, countries with positive excess balances would be assigned negative transfers, 
that is, would have to pay additional contributions to eliminate their excess balances. 
A complication that arises at this point is that while excess balances in normalized PPS units 
add up to zero by construction (because they are the residuals of a regression), compensating 
transfers in current euros do not necessarily do so. The difference between the first round 
estimates of total positive net transfers and total extra contributions under the compensation 
scheme is calculated in the lower part of the table and amounts to 1.4 billion euros. To get 
things to balance, we reduce all transfers and increase all contributions in the uniform 
proportion required for net payments to add up to zero. The value of the adjustment coefficient 
that will do the trick is 4.55%.5  
Adjusted compensating transfers are shown in column 6. The bottom part of this column shows 
the implications of the compensating transfer scheme for three groups of countries. Those 
countries that joined the Union in 2004 and 2007 would collectively lose 4.8 billion euros while 
the traditional cohesion countries or C4 (Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Greece) would have to 
pay additional contributions amounting to 2.9 billion. These payments would finance a net 
transfer of 7.7 billion to the remaining members of the EU15.   
There would be both winners and losers in each group of countries. Within the new entrants, 
Romania, Malta and Cyprus would receive positive compensating transfers, as would Spain 
within the second group. As for the group of richer countries, Luxembourg, the UK, Austria, 
Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden would have to increase their net contributions, 
while Germany, France, Italy and Belgium would be entitled to significant refunds. 
Our results indicate that the wealthier member states would be the main beneficiaries of the 
implementation of the compensation scheme if the expected degree of redistribution in the year 
of reference were to be held constant. If this outcome is deemed undesirable, the redistribution 
coefficient should be raised. Table 2 illustrates the sensitivity of the net positions of the three 
groups of member states mentioned above to changes in the redistribution coefficient and 
shows the total cost of the scheme as measured by the total amount of positive (or negative) 
compensating transfers. An increase in the redistribution coefficient to 3.0% would reduce the 
                                                
5 Let T be total (positive) transfers due and C total extra contributions (negative transfers). Since the 
required transfers exceed contributions, we have  
 (1) T – C = X > 0.  
We seek the value of the adjustment factor a such that  
 (2) (1-a)T – (1+a) C = 0.  
Substituting (1) into (2) and solving for a, we have  
 a = X/(T+C). 
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net cost to new entrants to 2.2 billion. A further increase to 3.5% would make the scheme 
neutral for the richer group of countries as a whole and would result in a transfer of 1.7 billion 
from the C4 (mostly from Ireland) to the Eastern European joining states. Increasing the 
redistribution coefficient would also raise the total cost of the scheme but only modestly, at least 
within the range of values contemplated in Table 2, because increasing transfers to the poorer 
member states tends to be relatively cheap in nominal terms due to their low price levels. 
 
Table 2: Sensitivity of results to changes in the redistribution coefficient 
__________________________________________________________ 
redistr. coefficient = 2.68% 3.00% 3.50% 4.00% 
total transfers to groups of member countries:    
new entrants -4,825 -2,238 1,832 5,990 
cohesion 4 -2,914 -2,452 -1,739 -1,031 
rest of EU15 7,739 4,690 -94 -4,959 
     total volume of transfers 15,584 15,697 17,504 19,507 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
In our opinion, a good case can be made for raising the redistribution coefficient to a level 
around 3.5%. As noted, a lower redistribution coefficient would imply that compensating 
transfers would flow on balance from poor to rich countries, which may be difficult to justify. In 
addition, such a change would still leave us far below the levels of redistributive effort that 
prevailed in the years immediately preceding Eastern Enlargement, which ranged between 5% 
and 6%. Table 3 shows the detailed implications of the compensating scheme with a 3.5% 
redistribution coefficient. One of the main changes relative to the scenario described in Table 1 
is that compensating transfers to Poland, Bulgaria and Portugal change sign and become 
positive. 
The estimated volume of compensating transfers is considerable in both scenarios. Under the 
assumptions underlying Table 3 the total transfer of resources across member states would 
amount to 17.5 billion euros at 2004 prices, which is more than twice the maximum cost 
contemplated by the Commission in its proposal for a generalized compensation mechanism. 
Column 6 shows the impact of estimated compensating transfer on each state’s total 
contributions to the Union. Some of the required transfers are also quite large when measured 
in this manner. For instance, the UK’s 6.9 billion contribution to the compensating scheme 
would amount to a 40% increase in its total payments into the EU budget, while Poland’s 1.2 
billion refund would reduce its net contribution by over 35%. Since the figures are even higher 
for some other member states, it would be advisable to phase in compensatory transfers over a 
relatively long period. We would argue for a 10-year transitory period during which the “call 
rate” on the theoretical value of the compensating payments would rise in even steps from 10% 
to 100%. We would expect that changes in expenditure and revenue policies during this period 
would reduce the volume of compensating transfers to values significantly below those shown 
in our illustrative tables. 
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Table 3: Estimated excess balances and compensating transfers, 2013 
Increasing the level of redistribution to 3.5% 
                                               Excess balances                                        Compensating transfers           . 
 
1.  per capita 
as a % of EU 
avge. GNIpc 
2. per 
capita in 
PPS units 
3. total in 
million PPS 
4. total in 
meuros 
5. adjusted 
total in 
meuros 
6. implied % 
chge. in total 
contributions 
Luxembourg 3.64% 981.1 481 -509 -468 296.9% 
Ireland 1.76% 474.2 2,117 -2,473 -2,273 145.9% 
Czech Rep. 0.70% 189.4 1,905 -1,377 -1,266 77.4% 
Estonia 0.69% 186.3 241 -173 -159 97.5% 
Hungary 0.62% 167.3 1,656 -1,148 -1,055 75.9% 
Lithuania 0.60% 161.8 533 -345 -317 86.1% 
UK 0.41% 110.8 6,819 -7,549 -6,938 40.6% 
Slovenia 0.41% 110.0 222 -183 -168 39.6% 
Austria 0.38% 102.9 856 -902 -829 31.8% 
Latvia 0.36% 97.3 214 -141 -130 60.5% 
Denmark 0.34% 92.2 506 -614 -564 26.2% 
Netherlands 0.30% 80.6 1,358 -1,452 -1,335 26.5% 
Greece 0.27% 72.0 817 -723 -665 30.1% 
Slovakia 0.25% 67.9 361 -244 -224 35.0% 
Sweden 0.23% 63.1 587 -663 -610 22.5% 
Finland 0.21% 56.9 303 -336 -309 18.3% 
Belgium 0.07% 18.7 199 -210 -193 4.3% 
France -0.05% -14.3 -919 968 1,046 -5.6% 
Spain -0.07% -18.0 -811 775 837 -8.1% 
Portugal -0.14% -36.6 -393 335 362 -22.6% 
Germany -0.14% -38.0 -3,147 3,293 3,559 -15.5% 
Poland -0.18% -49.2 -1,850 1,232 1,332 -35.5% 
Italy -0.38% -101.6 -5,961 6,057 6,547 -41.6% 
Bulgaria -0.41% -111.0 -806 413 446 -97.5% 
Cyprus -0.42% -114.1 -92 84 91 -47.4% 
Malta -0.54% -145.1 -63 49 53 -70.7% 
Romania -0.90% -243.1 -5,133 2,989 3,230 -234.9% 
       
total extra contributions due:  19,175 19,044 17,504  
total positive transfers due:  19,175 16,195 17,504  
transfers - contributions   -2,849   
adjustment factor   -8.08%   
       
new entrants    1,832 -17.1% 
cohesion 4     -1,739 11.0% 
rest of EU15     -94 0.1% 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
- Note: Columns 4 and 5 in millions of 2004 euros. 
 
 
 5. How should net balances be calculated? 
The estimates of net budget balances we have used in our illustrative calculations have been 
constructed using essentially the same procedure the European Commission currently follows 
to allocate its revenues and expenditures to member countries.6 We have proceeded in this 
manner for simplicity and to facilitate the comparison of our figures with other estimates of 
                                                
6 See for instance Annex IV of CEC (2007). 
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member country budgetary imbalances. We would argue, however, that certain aspects of this 
procedure should be modified before it can be used for the calculation of compensatory 
transfers. There are two issues that need to be addressed. The first one has to do with the 
criteria used to allocate certain expenditure and revenue items across member states, and the 
second with the desired treatment of unallocated expenditure. 
Regarding the first issue, the only problem that arises on the revenue side has to do with the 
treatment of traditional own resources (customs duties and agricultural levies net of the 
allowance for collection costs). We have treated these items as national contributions and 
assigned them to the member country that collected them, but it is clear that allocating tariff 
revenue of the basis of port of entry does not adequately capture the real distribution of the 
fiscal burden on imports.7 Hence, it would be preferable to allocate this revenue in proportion 
to GNI or to consumption. 
EU expenditures are allocated among member states by the Commission’s services on the basis 
of where the money is physically spent but this is not always a good measure of who benefits 
from it. One important example has to do with administrative costs: while most EU staff live 
and work in Belgium and Luxembourg, the work they carry out benefits all EU citizens in a 
similar way. As a result, it would not be reasonable to allocate their salaries only to these two 
countries. As the Commission itself does when calculating what it calls operating balances, we 
have excluded administrative expenses from our calculations so that member state net balances 
are unaffected by the geographical location of EU institutions. 
A similar adjustment would probably make sense also in the case of other budget items that 
generate large external benefits outside of the immediate geographical area where they are 
spent (as determined by the residence of the principal recipient of each payment). In particular, 
expenditure on border control, security, immigration, public health, consumer protection and 
basic research should probably be treated in the same way as administrative expenses and 
excluded from the calculation of net balances for purposes of determining the amount of 
compensatory payments. 
Finally, there is the question of how to deal with unallocated expenses, including foreign aid 
and other external expenditure as well as administration and the other items we have just 
mentioned. As it is shown  in the Appendix, under our proposed scheme the per capita burden 
of financing unallocated expenditure (that is, expenses of general interest and overhead costs) 
will be equal in real terms for all member countries. In our opinion this is not an unreasonable 
sharing rule, but a case could also be made for the financing of such expenditures in proportion 
to (real or nominal) income. If this second option is considered preferable, “unallocated 
expenditure” should be imputed in proportion of GNI rather than ignored in the relative 
balance calculations. 
                                                
7 For instance, Holland and Belgium collect a disproportionate share of traditional own resources because 
a large fraction of imports from outside the EU comes through their ports. This is the so-called Rotterdam 
or gateway effect. This effect may be partially offset by another one that would work in the opposite 
direction. This reverse gateway effect arises because tax rebates on agricultural exports to non-EU 
countries from Belgian and Dutch ports will tend to be attributed to these countries regardless of the 
origin of these products. Hence, export rebates should probably be allocated in proportion to the 
production of the relevant agricultural commodities. 
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 6. Conclusion 
We advocate the introduction of a system of compensatory transfers that will make the net 
balances of EU member states inversely proportional to their relative income leveles and the 
adoption of a multi-stage budget-setting procedure consistent with it. Under the proposed 
system, bargaining over the desired level of redistribution would be decoupled from the rest of 
the budget negotiation in order to make it easier for member state governments to discuss core 
EU revenue and expenditure policies on their own merits and not in terms of their impact on 
national fiscal balances. Any discrepancies between the financial outcome of such policies and 
the desired distribution of net balances would be eliminated by a compensation mechanism that 
could take the form of a system of horizontal transfers across member states. 
We have also advocated a revision of the rules currently used to allocate expenditures and 
contributions to member countries in order to bring such estimates closer into line with the real 
incidence of certain budget items for which the point of collection or the location of expenditure 
are not good indicators of who reaps the benefits or bears the costs. 
The system we propose would have several important advantages over current practices. It 
would provide a transparent way of implementing the principle of cohesion without sacrificing 
other policy objectives. It would also reduce the scope for real or perceived inequities in the 
allocation of budget resources by forcing member states to negotiate over a single, easily 
interpretable, parameter rather than about a host of specific items that may add up to 
apparently arbitrary allocations. In addition, setting net balances in advance of expenditure 
programs will in effect force national governments to bear the marginal cost of EU expenditure, 
thereby increasing the incentives for a more efficient allocation of resources. These advantages 
do come at a cost, however. The proposed procedure may actually increase the difficulty of 
reaching a budget consensus by sharply reducing the margin for "horse trading" across member 
states, and could make it harder for the Commission to push through proposals in areas in 
which European and national interests do not coincide. 
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 Appendix 
This Appendix describes in detail how relative balances are calculated and discusses some of 
their properties and the implications of their use as part of our proposed compensating scheme. 
To facilitate the discussion, section 1 goes through the analysis in nominal terms. In section 2 we 
discuss the complications that arise when we take into account differences in price levels across 
countries and explain how we deal with them. 
 
 1. Relative balances in nominal terms 
Let  
 Ci = country i's contributions to the EU budget 
 AE i = EU expenditure allocated to country i 
 C = C
i
I
! = total EU revenue from member state contributions 
 AE = AE
i
I
! = total EU expenditure allocated to member countries 
 NAE = total EU expenditure not allocated to member countries 
 N i = country i's population 
 N = N
i
I
! = total EU population 
All expenditure and revenue items defined above will be measured in current euros without 
taking into account differences in price levels across countries. We will use lower case 
characters to denote per capita amounts, so that, for example 
 ae i = AE i /N i 
The EU's budget deficit will be given by 
 (1) D = C - AE - NAE. 
Country i's net budgetary balance (NBi) will be defined as the difference between the 
expenditure allocated to it and its contribution to the EU budget, that is 
 (2) NBi = AEi - Ci 
Notice that the sum of the net balances of all member countries will be generally different from 
zero even with a zero deficit because some EU expenditure (e.g. foreign aid) is not allocated to 
any member state. In particular, 
 (3) NB = NB
i
=
i
! AEi " Ci =  
i
! AE " C
i
! = "(NAE + D)  
where we have made use of equation (1). 
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 Relative budgetary balances 
We will work with net balances measured in relative terms. A key advantage of this procedure 
is that it allows budget balances to be decomposed additively into a series of partial balances 
that can be attributed to individual expenditure and contribution items. Since we will not make 
use of this decomposition in the present paper, we will focus on other properties of relative 
balances. 
Formally, we define country i’s per capita relative balance with the Union as 
 (4) rnb
i
= nb
i
! nb  
where nb = NB/N is the average per capita net balance of the entire Union with NB as defined in 
equation (3).  
It is important to make explicit how relative balances deal with unallocated expenditure. Notice 
that country i’s total relative net balance with the Union can be written 
 (5) RNB
i
= rnb
i
*N
i
= nb
i
! nb( )*Ni =
AE
i
! C
i
N
i
!
AE ! C
N
"
#$
%
&'
*N
i
= AE
i
! C
i( ) +
N
i
N
(NAE + D)  
where we have used (3). Equation (5) shows that a country’s relative balance would be equal to 
its standard net balance if non-allocated expenditures and the Union’s deficit were imputed to 
member states in proportion to their population, so that per capita allocations would be the 
same for all countries.  
Notice that the sum of member countries' relative balance is zero: 
 (6) RNB
i
i
! = AEi " Ci( )
i
! + (NAE + D)
N
i
i
!
N
= AE " C + NAE + D = 0  
 
 Member states’ incentives  under the existing financing system 
To simplify matters, let us assume that the Union’s deficit is zero and that member states’ 
contributions to the Union are strictly proportional to their national incomes so that 
 (7) Ci = cYi 
where Yi is country i’s  GNI and c a call rate that is equal for all countries. Given the dominant 
weight of the GNI resource and the corrections that have been introduced to bring the base of 
the VAT resource closer to GNI, this would be a good approximation in the absence of ad-hoc 
exceptions to general budget rules like the UK rebate. 
To preserve budget balance, c must be set so that (ex-ante) contributions are equal to total 
expenditures, 
 (8) cY = AE + NAE! c = AE + NAE
Y
 
In “equilibrium” country i’s total contributions will be given by 
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 (9) Ci* = (AE + NAE)
Yi
Y
= AEi + NAE + AEj
j!i
"
#
$%
&
'(
Yi
Y
 
and its net balance will be 
 (10) NBi* = AEi ! Ci* == AEi ! AEi + NAE + AEj
j"i
#
$
%&
'
()
Yi
Y
= AEi 1!
Yi
Y
$
%&
'
()
! NAE + AEj
j"i
#
$
%&
'
()
Yi
Y
 
Hence, all member states contribute to the financing of all expenditures in proportion to their 
shares in aggregate EU income. Countries have an incentive to try to maximize their own 
allocated expenditure because its marginal cost is very low, particularly in small and relatively 
poor countries. This is true even if a dollar of such expenditure is valued less than a dollar of 
contributions or of direct expenditure by the national government. 
 
 Member states’ incentives  under the proposed compensation scheme 
Under the scheme proposed in this paper, countries would pay or receive compensatory 
transfers that would have to be added to their regular budget contributions. The amount of the 
compensatory transfer payable to country i, Ti, will be given by 
 (11) Ti = Niti = Ni !"(yi ! y) ! rnbi[ ] = Ni "(y ! yi ) ! rnbi[ ]  
where –ρ is the slope coefficient of the redistribution regression (see Figure  1 or 2 in the text). 
Notice that countries receive positive transfers if their income per capita is below the Union 
average (yi < y) and have to make additional contributions (receive negative transfers) 
otherwise. Operating with this expression and using equation (5) 
 (12) Ti = Ni !(y " yi ) " rnbi[ ] = !(y " yi )Ni " RNBi = !(y " yi )Ni " AEi " Ci( ) "
Ni
N
(NAE + D)  
Now, country i’s total adjusted contributions will be given by 
(13) Ci** = Ci ! Ti = Ci ! "(y ! yi )Ni + AEi ! Ci( ) +
Ni
N
(NAE + D) = AEi +
Ni
N
(NAE + D) + "(yi ! y)Ni  
and their net balances by 
 (17) NBi** = AEi ! Ci** = "(y ! yi )Ni !
Ni
N
(NAE + D)  
Hence, under the proposed compensating scheme, each country will pay for all expenditure 
allocated to it and for the fraction of "overhead expenses" (non-allocated expenditure and the 
budget deficit) that corresponds to it by population. In addition, there is a redistributive 
component of total contributions that is proportional to the country's income gap with the EU 
average. Net balances are independent of own allocated expenditure and depend only on the 
level of income and the amount of overhead expenditure. 
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 2. Adjusting for price differences 
Differences in price levels across EU member states are very important. Setting the average 
price level of the entire EU to 100, relative prices in 2005 ranged from Denmark’s 134 to 
Lithuania’s 50. As a result, comparisons of income levels with data in “nominal euros” can be 
very misleading. Similarly, expressing measures of national contributions and net balances at 
current national prices will not adequately capture the sacrifices or benefits they entail. To 
avoid these problems we have measured the income of EU member states and the budget flows 
across them in real terms, that is, in normalized PPS units or euros of equal purchasing power. 
This section shows how price corrections affect the calculations and results described in the 
previous section of this appendix. 
We will use primes to denote variables measured in PPS units normalized so that the average 
price level of the EU is equal to 1 in each year. Hence, Yi’ will be country i’s real national 
income, i.e. GNI in normalized PPS units, and Yi will denote the same magnitude measured in 
nominal terms (current euros). By construction, aggregate EU income will be the same in real 
and nominal terms, i.e. Y = Y’. 
The index of relative country prices will be given by the ratio of nominal to real GNI (i.e. of GNI 
in current euros to GNI in normalized PPS units) 
 (15) P
i
=
Y
i
Y
i
'
 
National price indices will be normalized so their weighted average is equal to one: 
 (16) P = Y
Y '
! 1 =
Y
i
i
"
Y '
=
P
i
Y '
i
i
"
Y '
=
Y '
i
Y '
P
i
i
" . 
For most of our calculations it will be convenient to work with the inverse of the price index, i.e. 
with the relative deflator, which we will denote by Qi: 
 (17) Qi =
1
P
i
=
Y
i
'
Y
i
! Y
i
' = Q
i
Y
i  
 
 Real balances 
Measured in real terms, country i's net balance will be given by 
 (18) NBi ' = NBiQi = (AEi ! Ci )Qi = AEi '! Ci ' = (aei '! ci ')Ni = nbi 'Ni  
Proceeding as before, but working with real magnitudes, we can define per capita and total 
relative balances. We have, in particular,  
 (19) RNB
i
' = rnb
i
'N
i
 
where relative real balances per capita are calculated as before but working with allocated 
expenditures and contributions measured in normalized PPS units 
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 (20) rnb
i
' = nb
i
'! nb '  
and nb’ is the average per capita real balance of the entire Union  
 (21) nb ' = NB '
N
=
1
N
NB
i
i
! '"#$
%
&'
=
1
N
AE '( C '( )  
The only complication this introduces is that total contributions and total expenditures will 
generally be different from zero when measured in PPS units even if the EU budget is balanced 
in nominal terms. Hence, the “budget deficit” calculated with deflated figures will include a 
(positive or negative) price differences term that will depend on the way in which net balances 
are distributed across countries with high and low price leveles. Using equation (3) we now 
have: 
(22) NB ' = NB
i
i
! ' = NBi
i
! Qi = NBi
i
! (Qi "1+1) = NBi
i
! (Qi "1) + NBi
i
! = NBi
i
! (Qi "1) + NB  
      = NB
i
i
! (Qi "1) " (NAE + D) # X " (NAE + D)  
where X is the sum of national balances weighted by the corresponding relative price levels or, 
for short, the price corrections term. Notice that if Qi = 1 for all i then X = 0. 
Using this expression, country i’s relative real balance will be given by 
(23) RNB
i
' = N
i
NB
i
'
N
i
!
NB '
N
"
#$
%
&'
= N
i
AE
i
'! C
i
'
N
i
!
X ! (NAE + D)
N
"
#$
%
&'
= (AE
i
'! C
i
') +
N
i
N
(NAE + D ! X)  
and its value in curent euros will be 
(24) RNB
i
'P
i
= (AE
i
'! C
i
')P
i
+
N
i
N
(NAE + D ! X)P
i
= (AE
i
! C
i
) +
N
i
N
(NAE + D ! X)P
i
 
That is, working with real relative balances amounts to allocating the sum of overhead 
expenditures (non-allocated expenditures and the budget deficit adjusted by the price 
corrections term) across countries on an equal per capita basis in real terms. Hence, when we 
convert relative balances to nominal terms, countries with higher price levels will be allocated a 
greater share of overhead expenditures.  
 
 Compensatory transfers and total contributions under the proposed scheme 
Under our proposal, the real compensatory transfer payable to country i, Ti, will be given in a 
first approximation by 
 (25) Ti ' = Niti ' = Ni !"(yi '! y ') ! rnbi '[ ] = "(y '! yi ')Ni ! RNBi '  
Member states pay positive transfers if their real income per capita exceeds the Union average. 
Notice that compensatory transfers add up to zero in real terms because they are defined as the 
residuals of the redistribution regression. When transformed into nominal terms, however, they 
may not add up to zero and will in general have to be adjusted. 
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Let PT and NT be the total amounts in nominal terms of positive and negative transfers, 
 PT = T
i
i:T
i
'>0
! 'Pi    and    NT = ! Ti
i:T
i
'<0
" 'Pi  
To get things to balance, we will reduce all positive transfers and increase all negative ones (i.e. 
increase net contributions) in the same proportion, a. We seek the value of the adjustment 
coefficient a such that  
 (1! a)PT = (1+ a)NT  
Solving this equation we have 
 (26) a = PT ! NT
NT + PT
 
Hence, final compensatory payments in nominal terms to country i will be given by 
 T
i
*
=
(1! a)T
i
'P
i
= (1! a) "(y '! y
i
')N
i
! RNB
i
'[ ]Pi        if Ti ' > 0
(1+ a)T
i
'P
i
= (1+ a) "(y '! y
i
')N
i
! RNB
i
'[ ]Pi        if Ti ' < 0
#
$
%
&%
 
or, using equation (24), 
(27) Ti* =
(1! a) "(y '! yi ')NiPi ! (AEi ! Ci ) !
Ni
N
(NAE + D ! X)Pi
#
$%
&
'(i
       if Ti ' > 0
(1+ a) "(y '! yi ')NiPi ! (AEi ! Ci ) !
Ni
N
(NAE + D ! X)Pi
#
$%
&
'(
        if Ti ' < 0
)
*
++
,
+
+
 
Now, country i’s total adjusted contributions will be given in nominal terms by 
Ci
*
=
Ci ! (1! a)Ti 'Pi = aCi ! (1! a) "(y '! yi ')NiPi ! AEi !
Ni
N
(NAE + D ! X)Pi
#
$%
&
'(
         if Ti ' > 0
Ci ! (1+ a)Ti 'Pi = !aCi ! (1+ a) "(y '! yi ')NiPi ! AEi !
Ni
N
(NAE + D ! X)Pi
#
$%
&
'(
       if Ti ' < 0
)
*
++
,
+
+
 
or 
(28) Ci* =
aCi + (1! a) !"(y '! yi ')NiPi + AEi +
Ni
N
(NAE + D ! X)Pi
#
$%
&
'(
         if Ti ' > 0
!aCi + (1+ a) !"(y '! yi ')NiPi + AEi +
Ni
N
(NAE + D ! X)Pi
#
$%
&
'(
       if Ti ' < 0
)
*
++
,
+
+
 
Since a will generally be close to zero, this expression says that, to a first approximation, each 
country’s contribution to the Union has three components: 
- full repayment for all EU expenditures allocated to it (AEi), 
- an equal per capita share in real terms of “overhead” expenditures (nominal contributions to 
the financing of overhead expenditures increase proportionately with the country’s price level), 
N
i
N
(NAE + D ! X)P
i
"
#$
%
&'
, and 
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- a redistributive payment which is positive if the country’s real income per capita is above the 
Union average and negative otherwise, !(y
i
'" y ')  
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